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AUTHORITARIANISM VERSUS WELFARE POLICY: THE 
TWO FACES OF THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
Augusto De Venanzi1 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY  PURDUE UNIVERSITY - FORT WAYNE 
Abstract: 
Since Hugo Chávez’s rise to the presidency, Venezuela has be-
come a deeply divided country. The ensuing polarization has ex-
pressed in violent forms of political fanaticism; in the partisan 
fracture of many professional and labor associations, of the 
army, in open warfare between private and public media outlets; 
in the weakening of the private sector of the economy and, over-
all, in the erosion of sociability. The present article seeks to ex-
plain the causes of such a high degree of polarization. It departs 
from two main hypotheses: First, the Bolivarian Revolution re-
veals two distinct faces: an authoritarian face and a welfare face. 
Second, the coexistence of these two faces accounts for the high 
degree of political polarization. The article concludes by arguing 
that the contrasting perspectives Venezuelans hold in relation to 
the Bolivarian Revolution are closely associated to their diver-
gent views regarding the meaning and practice of democracy.  
Key words: Venezuela, political polarization, Hugo Chavez, 
authoritarianism, welfare policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution has provoked strong reac-
tions –for and against– within and without Venezuela. On the do-
mestic front, the revolution has implied a high degree of political 
polarization, which has been expressed in many episodes of mass 
political mobilization and violence. On the International front the 
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revolution has received its share of attention from heads of state 
and governments, scholars, political and social activists, and televi-
sion and newspaper outlets. It would be accurate to say that the 
revolution has had a galvanizing effect upon international public 
opinion, too.  
The article’s first premise is that the Bolivarian revolution com-
prises two markedly distinct faces: a political face that is very much 
tainted by authoritarian practices and disregard for the democratic 
process, and a second one marked by the government’s attempts 
at promoting welfare among the most vulnerable sectors of the 
population. These contrasting faces, it is further argued, are able to 
account for the high levels of conflict existing around president 
Chávez’s government. At the center of the political conflict stand 
two diametrically opposed views about the meaning and practice of 
democracy among Venezuelans of different class extraction.  
The political events leading to the inauguration of the Chávez 
regime and its socially divisive policies are many and complex. 
They follow a long and twisting path from the fall of the M. P. 
Jimenez’s dictatorship in 1958 and the conformation of the Punto 
Fijo Pact; to the explosion of oil prices throughout the 1970s; to 
the debt crisis and the devaluation of the Venezuelan currency of 
the early 1980s; to the efforts to ‘democratize the democracy’ of 
the late 1980s (Crisp and Levine, 1998); to president C. A. Pérez’s 
1989 attempt to liberalize the economy and the ensuing popular 
uprising known as the Caracazo, and two failed military coups in 
1992 (Lander, 1996; Cedeño, 2006); to C. A. Pérez’s impeach-
ment later in the same year (Corrales, 2002; Valenzuela, 2004); 
and finally to the complete disintegration of the traditional party 
system in the presidential election of 1993 (Dietz and Mayers, 
2007). In this 1993 election R. Caldera, founder of COPEI, left the 
organization and founded a small party called Convergencia, 
which won the election with 30.46 percent of the vote (Landman, 
1993). Caldera’s second term turned out to be extremely unsuc-
cessful. The final legacy of his administration was a devaluation of 
the national currency by 70 per cent, an interest rate of 69 per 
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cent, a huge capital flight, and the highest poverty levels seen in 
Venezuelan modern history (Maingon, 2004; De Venanzi, 2006). 
Given this convergence of adverse events, it should not come as 
a surprise that the population was willing to experiment with differ-
ent political alternatives (Mainwaring, 2006). Thus, in December 
1998, Hugo Chávez, an outsider to the political system, was 
elected president of Venezuela with 56.20 per cent of the ballot.  
Of crucial relevance to the process eroding the Venezuelan 
traditional democratic system is the founding in 1982, of a con-
spiratorial group led by Lt. Col. Hugo Chávez –The Movimiento 
Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR200)– that aimed to capture 
political power by force (Norden, 1996). The 1992 coups perpe-
trated by this group failed, yet they were able to undermine the 
foundations of the political system’s capacity to govern (Myers and 
O’connor, 1998). It is worth noting that since its inception the MBR 
200 established close links with civilians who had fought in the 
guerrilla movement of the 1960s. The alliances with civilians fur-
ther extended after the failed coups to include groups of intellec-
tuals, journalists, and leftist political activists, thus becoming an 
example of what Payne (2000) terms uncivil movements: in short, 
civilian-military coalitions that disproportionately and illegitimately 
affect the conduct of the state. It is the uncivil nature of the group 
now governing Venezuela where we can locate the authoritarian 
roots of the Chávez regime. Of equal importance in understanding 
the nature of the current Venezuelan government is by compre-
hending the ways in which the social concerns of the MBR 200 
have expressed under Chávez’s presidency.  
Section one of this article explores the authoritarian face of 
president Chávez’s government. It points to the uncivil nature of the 
movement that originally brought Chávez to the attention of the 
public: the MBR 200. A second theme is that of the authoritarian 
style of government imposed by president Chávez and the 
Movimiento V Republica, characterized by a strong hold on all 
branches of the state and a high degree of intolerance toward po-
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litical opponents. The section attempts to show that under Chávez’s 
presidency, Venezuela’s regime has moved toward what Carothers 
(2002), terms a dominant power politics system: a regime that 
seems to adhere to standard democratic practices but which is ea-
ger to abuse power.  
Section two deals with the welfare face of the regime: it offers 
an analysis of the most important social policies and programs im-
plemented by president Chávez’s government. The section is not 
intended as an exercise in program evaluation (a task that would 
require a complete article in itself), but simply aims to describe the 
nature of these programs and their impact upon selected social and 
demographic indicators.  
Section three explores the extent to which the authoritarian and 
welfare faces of the Chávez regime are able to account for the high 
degree of political polarization affecting Venezuela. This section 
aims to reveal that although previous analyses of such polarization 
have shown important dimensions of the Venezuelan political proc-
ess (Gott, 2000; Corrales, 2005; Cedeño, 2006; Cannon, 2008; 
Heath, 2009) they also tend to ignore crucial aspects of the prob-
lem. The section will argue that for a more complex analysis of the 
factors stirring political polarization in Venezuela, related to con-
trasting meanings Venezuelans attach to the meaning and practice 
of democracy.  
The conclusion summarizes my findings and makes the case for 
the need of some degree of consensus between detractors and 
followers of president Chávez. If his regime were to build in the re-
spect for democratic freedoms as well as strengthen and institu-
tionalize the significant government’s efforts at fighting poverty and 
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social exclusion, the existing polarization and violence are likely to 
fade2.  
THE VENEZUELAN ROAD TO AUTHORITARIANISM 
Carothers (2002) has provided two useful concepts with which 
to describe the nature of the political regimes emerging from the 
third-wave democratization, but which also can be used to classify 
democratic regimes in most developing countries. He postulates 
that the worldwide drive toward democratization has come to a halt, 
bringing on political regimes that stand somewhere within a political 
grey zone between dictatorship and democracy. Yet there are dif-
ferences among these quasi-democratic states. Carothers uses the 
term feckless pluralism to denote regimes characterized by ample 
political liberties, but with little political participation beyond voting, 
and where political parties are perceived by the population to be 
corrupt, self-interested, and inefficient in solving the nations’ most 
important problems. A second group of countries is trapped within 
what Carothers terms dominant-power politics. In this case we have 
regimes with some basic forms of democracy. Nonetheless, one 
leader, political party, or family dominates the system in such a 
manner that there are few prospects of alternations in power. 
Moreover, the lines between the state and the ruling party become 
blurred, giving way to ominous forms of corruption. Elections are 
dubious but not outright fraudulent. Existing opposition parties are 
so excluded from the power system that they become weak and 
lose credibility. Hence the oppositional role is played by civic 
groups, NGOs, and by the independent media.  
This article contends that under president Chávez we are wit-
nessing the case of a country with a long-standing democracy, al-
beit of the feckless pluralist type, move toward the dominant-power 
                                                      
2 The concern with extreme polarization is rooted in A. Valenzuela’s (1978) thesis that 
countries experiencing a high degree of political conflict may also experience the 
breakdown of their democratic systems. 
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politics model. I will point to issues such as the remarkable concen-
tration of power in the executive branch of the state; the strong ten-
dency to pass key legislation by presidential decree; the populist 
style employed by the president; the use of state violence against 
opponents, and finally to the attempt by president Chavez at con-
structing a unified social order of a strong personal nature. Indeed, 
some observers of the Venezuelan situation contend that the 
Chávez regime is decidedly less open and pluralistic than its 
predecessors (McCoy and Myers, 2004). 
In the author’s view, the Venezuelan transition to the annotated 
dominant-power politics model is strongly associated with the un-
civil nature (Payne, 2000) of the movement that originally brought 
Chávez to the attention of the nation: the Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario 200. The arrival of this uncivil movement to power in 
1999 explains not only the intolerance of the Chávez regime toward 
its opponents, but also the nature of the recurring themes present 
in the discourse of the Bolivarian revolution. 
Payne (2000) coined the concept of uncivil movement to refer to 
movements that forge civic-military coalitions of uncertain ideologi-
cal content –generally a right-wing diffuse ideology– which tends to 
disproportionately and illegitimately influence the conduct of the 
state. Payne mentions in passing that Chávez’s movement may 
constitute the first left-wing uncivil movement in Latin America. The 
MBR 200 started as an alliance of various junior officers led by 
Chávez as far back as 1982, and aspired to gain political power. 
The MBR 200 movement had a broad perspective on what should 
be done to take care of Venezuela’s multiple troubles. At first, they 
were concerned with the ethical degradation of the preceding 
Venezuelan governments. The members of the MBR-200 consid-
ered that the state should build a more just and equitable society, 
and should also fight the high levels of poverty which, in their view, 
were mostly the result of administrative corruption, the plundering 
of the treasury, and the weight of external debt. But there were less 
altruistic causes, too. Venezuela’s economic crisis had also 
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reached the military: officers and troops were poorly paid; the insti-
tution was under-funded and under-equipped. The MBR-200 com-
mitted itself to forging a civilian-military movement whose 
magnitude was clearly exposed during the second military coup of 
1992. The fusion of the MBR 200 and their civil counterparts was 
formalized in October 1997 with the foundation of the Movimiento V 
Republica (Canache, 2002).  
Since its beginnings, the Chávez government has revealed a 
very strong tendency to concentrate all power in the executive 
branch (Marquez, 2004), and to appoint a large number of military 
officers to staff non-military posts in government (Roland and Da-
nopoulos, 2003). According to Sanchez (2008: 325), Chavez’s 
years in office have been ‘marked by executive encroachment and 
control over all manner of state institutions, a steady erosion of in-
stitutional checks and balances upon executive power, and, ulti-
mately, a withering away of democratic governance’. Such 
concentration of power was made possible by the high ballot ob-
tained by the Movimiento V Republica in the 1998 election and in 
subsequent elections to the National Assembly, allowing Chávez to 
designate loyalists in the key positions of the Venezuelan state.  
Regardless president Chávez’s claim that Venezuela has made 
a transition from a representative democracy to a deliberative de-
mocracy, the case is that most important legislation has been 
passed through presidential decrees. This has been the case even 
though from the very beginning of his administration the president’s 
governing coalition has controlled the National Assembly. Corrales 
brings forth the point that during 2001 Chávez passed thirty-nine 
decrees dealing with the most varied issues. Afterward, in 2006 the 
National Assembly gave Chávez special powers to legislate by de-
cree for a period of 18 months (Corrales, 2005). During the 18 
months the law was in force, President Chávez issued a total of 66 
decrees. Moreover, the far reaching constitutional changes pre-
sented to the electorate by president Chávez in the constitutional 
referendum of December, 2007 were not put up for discussion by 
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his own partisans and followers, much less confronted with the 
views laid down by the opposition. According to Corrales (2009: 78) 
the proposal to reform the 1999 constitution was “drafted in secrecy 
by a small group of the president’s advisers whose names were not 
disclosed”. President Chávez transformed the referendum into a 
plebiscite, and lost. He was forced to promote a new constitutional 
referendum in 2009 regarding the sole issue of indefinite re-election 
to keep alive his aspiration to run for president in 2012 and thereaf-
ter. A first-class example of Chavez’s regime abuse of power is 
provided by the many obstacles the National Elections Board (con-
trolled by Chávez’s loyalists) interposed in way of the citizen initi-
ated recall referendum of 2004. The Board was able to postpone 
the implementation of this constitutional figure for a full year until 
the polls showed an increased level of popularity for the president ( 
a full account of these events in Kornblith, 2005). Yet, as we will 
see later, Chávez’s government has encouraged and supported the 
creation of a number of grass-roots social organizations.  
Uncivil movements, says Payne (2000), are not guided by a 
stable program, the leader is the program; and thus, the movement 
tends to be constantly changing as a result of the personal adapta-
tions to the circumstances that surround him. This feature of uncivil 
movements shows markedly in the lack of doctrinal clarity that 
characterizes the discourse of the Bolivarian revolution. When cam-
paigning for the presidency in 1997, Norden (1996: 129) states, 
Chávez employed ‘a rather vague discourse, often characterized by 
inconsistencies’. Ronald and Danopoulos (2003: 67) note that 
Chávez’s campaign message was ‘one part of revolution, one part 
of reform, and one part of populism.’ The lack of a clear message 
continued after Chávez became president. At the beginning of his 
mandate, Chávez spoke of the need for a Bolivarian revolution. Fol-
lowing the ideas of N. Ceresole, principal advisor to Chávez during 
the indicated period, the revolution should aim to build a ‘leader-
army-people’ party for the realization of great historical feats; patri-
otism and self-sacrifice were to be core values of the new revolu-
tion. Afterward in 2002, Chávez argued that his movement was 
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inspired by the British Third Way. Then, in 2004 Chávez’s focus 
shifted to the doctrine of endogenous development3. Since 2006, 
however, a new slogan came into being: XXI Century Socialism. 
The concrete political content of this newer doctrine is revealed in 
the proposed reform to the 1999 constitution, which included fea-
tures such as a return to centralized authority (a measure that 
strikes at the heart of deliberative democracy), a presidential term 
of seven years from six, an increased number of signatures to acti-
vate a recall referendum, among others (De Venanzi, 2006). In 
April 2009 the National Assembly passed the Regimen del Distrito 
Capital, a law that allows the president to appoint a ‘chief’ with the 
power to oversee and control the performance of the democratically 
elected mayor of the Capital District (El Nacional, 3 April 2009). 
The diffuse character of the ideas driving the Bolivarian revolu-
tion explains why many supporters and opponents of Chávez sim-
ply call his movement Chavismo. Nevertheless, there are certain 
continuities along this political process. Shifter (2006) contends, for 
instance, that the essence of Chavismo relies in the charismatic 
qualities of Chávez, and in the continuous political mobilization of 
the marginalized around some indeterminate ideal of participatory 
democracy. Although arguing from a more sympathetic stance to 
the Bolivarian revolution, Ellner (2002) has highlighted president 
Chávez’s populist style, too. In his view, this style revealed itself in 
the strong anti-party discourse Chávez employed during the elec-
toral campaign of 1998 and thereafter. His speeches contain fierce 
attacks on traditional political institutions while at the same time 
calling for direct citizen participation in the form of referenda and 
popular assemblies. In his discourse Chávez refers to his humble 
roots, his Indian and black features, and to his outsider status -
successfully establishing a strong identification between himself 
and the vast sectors of Venezuela’s marginalized. Overall, presi-
                                                      
3 Endogenous development seeks the satisfaction of basic needs, the participation of the 
community, the protection of the environment, and the localization of the community in a 
determined space. See Ministerio de Información y Comunicación (2004).  
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dent Chávez represents the figure of a classic populist; Hawkins 
(2003) notes, for instance, that in Chávez’s discourse we find an 
overemphasis upon the notion of the popular sovereignty and a 
strong socially divisive rhetoric. As to the practice of populism, we 
find a concern for mobilizing large numbers of the marginalized, 
government-funded grass-roots organizations, and the institution of 
civil groups with the intent of intimidating adversaries. In contrast to 
neo-populists such as Menem or Fujimori, president Chávez ex-
ploits a radical nationalist ideology and rejects market economics in 
favor of state interventionism and the reliance on price controls and 
subsidies. There is, nevertheless, a novel aspect in Chávez’s popu-
lism: the denunciation of the values associated with modernity and 
modernization; indeed, his vision of Venezuela’s future is caught up 
in the traditional values of the country’s province (Cedeño, 2006). 
Authoritarianism is inherently in tension with the rule of law and 
institutional state building. Casey (2005) has illustrated the workings 
of state violence under Chávez’s regime: between 1999 and 2003, 
fifty-five Venezuelans had died in instances of street violence 
mostly in anti-government demonstrations that were violently at-
tacked by Chávez’s supporters. In Hawkin’s (2003: 1140) view, 
Chávez’s Manichaean discourse of the people versus the elite has 
encouraged an attitude of anything goes among the president’s 
supporters. After all, ‘if the leader embodies the popular will, the 
opposition must be corrupt and illegitimate, and any means includ-
ing violence can be legitimately employed against them.’ Casey 
(2005) argues that the Venezuelan police and National Guard use 
excessive force against Chávez demonstrators and that detained 
protesters are ill treated and tortured. The same concern has been 
voiced by the Foro por la Vida (2009), an association comprising 14 
human rights NGOs, which has complained about the excesses of 
public authorities in the control of anti-government peaceful dem-
onstrations.  
The most comprehensive account of the worsening of human 
and political rights during the Chávez decade is that compiled in 
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September 2008 by Human Rights Watch (2008). The Report 
points to a series of governmental practices that amount to abuses 
of power including blacklisting, attacks on the freedom of the press, 
violation of organized labor laws, lack of division of powers, court-
packing, violation of international treaties on human rights, and 
many other practices that denote a great measure of political intol-
erance against opponents. HRW (2008) has also expressed its 
concern regarding cases of extrajudicial killings by security agents, 
which remain a frequent occurrence in Venezuela. Between Janu-
ary 2000 and February 2007 the attorney general’s office registered 
6,068 alleged killings by the police and National Guard, and im-
punity remains the norm. For its part, Amnesty International (2009) 
indicates that in Venezuela government officials are undermining 
human rights by making unfounded accusations against human 
rights organizations. Another issue of concern for Amnesty Interna-
tional is the wide-spread attacks on independent journalists and 
media outlets.  
It must be added that the president has used the previsions re-
garding direct democracy included in the 1999 constitution as a tool 
to bypass the discussion of potentially conflictive legislation, and to 
impose plebiscitary conceptions of governance (Kornblith, 2005; 
Breuer, 2008) The easiness with which president Chávez set in 
motion the government initiated 2007 and 2009 referenda stands in 
stark contrast with the many obstacles the National Election Board 
interposed in the way of the citizen initiated collect referendum of 
2004. 
Uncivil leadership sets itself up as the voice of social groups 
excluded from the political or economic system, for which it con-
structs a new identity generally rooted in historical and traditional 
values (Payne, 2000). It appeals to the epic achievements of in-
digenous heroic figures to justify its fight against the alleged forces 
of evil. To be sure, Chávez’s discourse overflows with references 
to the great undertakings of the heroes of the war for independ-
ence. The exploits of Simón Bolivar, The Liberator, play a crucial 
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role in the way Chávez perceives the nature of the task before him. 
The president is also fond of employing autochthonous Indian 
names to designate some of his campaigns and undertakings. Zu-
quete (2008: 91) has suggested that Chavez’s recourse to name 
his policies after historical figures works to reinforce the connection 
of the masses with a mythical past. Also, the president’s political 
style represents a form of missionary politics ‘that should be un-
derstood as a form of political religion characterized by a dynamic 
relationship between a charismatic leader and a moral community 
that is invested with a mission of salvation against conspiratorial 
enemies’. The mission consists of a world-wide struggle against 
global capitalism and rampant materialism.  
To many of his followers Chávez represents a charismatic and 
messianic figure. More generally, the political qualities of charisma 
become explicit in the form of a strong leader who attempts to re-
store a unitary representation of the world, against the diverse and 
complex variety of social representations and the feelings of risk 
and uncertainty that life acquires under global modernization (Lash 
et al., 1997; Beck, 2002). This historical re-elaboration comprises a 
fundamental counter-modernization narrative that works to revive 
feelings of communal and personal security4. Such a discourse 
guarantees the unconditional support to the movement from those 
groups who harbor feelings of disenchantment with modernization, 
who feel nostalgia for the predominance of a fractured pre-modern 
archetype, and who demand the return of a heroic sense in the 
conception of the nation’s history, a sense that president Chávez 
masterfully introduces in his political speeches. Rangel and Vil-
                                                      
4 Beck (2002: 210) says of individuals and societies forced to enter second modernity: 
‘Individualization does not automatically mean that people want to live as individuals and 
relate to one another as individuals. It could mean a new form of reflexive fundamentalism 
as well, which attempts to redefine collective identities… There will be resistance in the 
second modernity to individualization and to the way globalisation deterritorialises national 
cultures. It will come in particular from religious movements, the revival of ethnicities, and 
counter-modern movements, paradoxically using the information technology of the second 
modernity to organize themselves globally’. 
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laroel’s (2007) study shows that Chavez’s sympathizers tend to see 
him as having special and extraordinary qualities; that his actions 
transpire a mythical and heroic dimension; and that his main con-
cern is with the wellbeing of the poor.   
In opposition to the traditional modernization creed, which in 
Latin America produced societies marked by extremes of wealth 
and destitution (see Mires, 2000), president Chávez proposes to 
build a unified social order of a strong personal nature. This in-
cludes a pristine and nostalgic vision of the Venezuelan rural order, 
from which he personally comes (Cedeño, 2006). In Zuquete’s 
(2008: 113) view, Chávez’s discourse offers the marginalized a ho-
listic and messianic view of the world, a discourse that ‘claims to 
have the answers for ultimate questions and aims to shape and 
purify the collective consciousness.’ The messianic worldview ex-
presses ‘in the apocalyptic tone in Chávez’s discourse’ and in his 
conviction that Venezuela represents ‘the possibility of both re-
newal and the creation of a new era.’ Chávez’s discourse assumes 
the form of televised conversations where the president narrates 
historical anecdotes, provides alternate interpretations of crucial 
events in Venezuela’s history, and sings popular songs. In doing 
so, the president brings to the fore the folk elements of Venezuela’s 
culture. Not surprisingly, in the constitutional referenda of 2007 and 
2009, support for the president was exceptionally high in rural ar-
eas and smaller urban centers where the traditional way of life is 
most ingrained (Corrales, 2009).  
THE WELFARE FACE OF THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
Undoubtedly closing the gap between those who live in social 
exclusion and those who enjoy civic rights represents the greatest 
challenge for all developing societies. It is a complex task that goes 
beyond improving the economic revenue of the poor and hopes to 
integrate the population into the social, economic, and political sys-
tems that give access to true citizenship. In opposition to these 
principles, populist leadership implies a mode of linkage between 
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voters and politicians defined by an exchange of goods, usually 
votes for selective incentives although in some cases when cha-
risma is exceptional the exchange can adopt a second modality 
defined by an exchange of votes for some vague and utopian pro-
grams (Hawkins, 2003).   
In Venezuela the exploitation of a radical populist discourse by 
president Chávez, in conjunction with massive social spending, the 
largest in Latin America to date, have won him the support of large 
segments of society (Penfold-Becerra, 2007). From a doctrinal 
point of view the social programs developed and implemented by 
the government were supposed to follow a set of valuable princi-
ples contained in the new 1999 constitution, regarding popular de-
liberation and the attainment of equal rights (Maingon, 2004). The 
social question in the 1999  
Constitution is delineated along three basic principles: first, the 
search for equality, social solidarity, and social wellbeing; second, 
the construction of citizenship where social rights are universal, and 
third, the rescue of public space as the site upon which to build par-
ticipatory democracy (Title I, articles one, two, and three). Chapters 
V and VI of the Constitution guarantee public health and education 
for all, the public provision for the care of the elderly and the dis-
abled, public access to housing, public access to family planning, 
public provision of social security, full employment, a dignified 
minimum wage for all workers, the defense of cultural rights, and 
the right to leisure and participation in sports. It is worth noting that 
education and health appear as Human Rights in the new Constitu-
tion  (Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
2001). 
As it was previously stated, the Chávez government has facili-
tated some forms of grass-root social participation. Among these 
new forms we can recognize neighborhood organizations that work 
on civic programs (Ronald and Danopoulos, 2003). Available infor-
mation (UCAB, 2007) reveals that these new deliberative spaces 
have had some success in mobilizing the poor in seeking solutions 
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for some of their basic needs. In addition, fifty-five per cent of Vene-
zuelans think that Chávez’s government has procured an increase 
in the number of grass-root organizations committed to the promo-
tion of social welfare. Lower social strata (D and E) report that most 
of their social participation takes place within governmental organi-
zations. Only a minority of people belonging to these strata (14 per 
cent) reported participating in independent organizations. Participa-
tion in organizations which define themselves as being pro-
government is strong, accounting for 35 per cent of all social in-
volvement; organizations defining themselves as independent cap-
ture 20 per cent of total participation, whereas NGOs that see 
themselves as playing an oppositional role capture 16 per cent. 
There is, however, a strong belief in 60 per cent of the sample that 
only those organizations directly associated to and funded by the 
government can succeed in bringing welfare to the population.  
Despite these efforts and of the participatory spirit that flows 
through the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution, most attempts of presi-
dent Chávez’s government to produce social programs have ended 
in a collection of assistance programs of a highly centralized nature 
(Alvarado, 2003). President Chávez launched the first wave of so-
cial programs in 1999 under the name Plan Bolívar 2000. These 
plans aimed at feeding the poor. They engaged the Armed Forces 
in what became an unregulated and disorganized effort to distribute 
food and the benefit of ambulatory dental services, all centralized in 
the Fondo Único Social. Alvarado maintains that this Plan was in-
coherently designed and became seriously discredited as a result 
of accusations of corruption and embezzlement. These facts, 
added to the government’s inability to fight poverty and the growing 
rate of unemployment, plunged the popularity of president Chávez 
to 23 per cent in 2003. Nevertheless, his popularity increased in 
2004 as a result of the implementation of a new set of social poli-
cies called misiones (Kornblith, 2005). 
Following is an analysis of the performance of the Chávez re-
gime in the area of welfare policy. It includes a look at Venezuelan 
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public spending, and an assessment of the results of the most im-
portant missions.  
One way of ascertaining a government’s commitment to fighting 
poverty consists in looking at its levels of social spending. Chart 1 
below shows the social spending incurred by successive Venezue-
lan governments as a percentage of GDP since 1992.  
Chart 1. Venezuela. Social Spending as Percentage of GDP (1993-
2006) 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
%  20.8 23.1 21.2 22.6 25.4 23.6 24.5 29.5 31.5 28.3 31.0 28.4 28.5 30.97 
Source: Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Planificación y el 
Desarrollo (2008). Sectors included in the calculations are educa-
tion, health, culture, science, housing, social security, culture-
communication, and science  
and technology. 
 
Chart one show that Venezuelan social spending has experi-
enced an increase from 20.85 per cent in 1993, to 30.97 per cent in 
2006. Most of the spending has been directed to the fields of edu-
cation, social security, health, housing, social development, culture 
and communication, and finally, science and technology. Hence we 
can conclude that Chávez’s government has destined an increasing 
amount of funds to deal with the country’s social problems.  
In the educational field, the most publicized program has been 
Misión Robinson; it aims at reducing the illiteracy rate. To this end it 
enrolled 128,967 facilitators to attend the needs of 1,536,119 
beneficiaries (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Planificación y el 
Desarrollo, 2008). The Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (2006) reports a slight decrease in the Venezuelan 
illiteracy rate between 2000 and 2005 from 7.5 per cent to 6 per 
cent respectively.  
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Another effort in the field of education has been Misión Ribas. 
Since its inception in 2003, the mission has provided high-school 
level classes to about five million Venezuelans who, due to different 
reasons, were forced to drop out of the educational system. In 2007 
the mission enrolled 608,326 students, graduating 168,253 of them 
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Energía y el Petróleo, 2008). 
The flagship of the government’s social programs is Misión Bar-
rio Adentro. This Misión provides medical attention to the poorest 
population in underserved regions of the country, mostly by Cuban 
doctors. According to official sources, Barrio Adentro employs 
15,449 doctors and has offered some 216,445,701 medical consul-
tations up to December 2006. Services are provided 24 hours a day 
for emergencies and are free of charge (Ministerio del Poder Popu-
lar para la Planificación y el Desarrollo, 2008). UNICEF has de-
clared that mission Barrio Adentro shows a great deal of potential 
as a model for comprehensive primary health care (UNICEF, 2005). 
Based on their ethnographic study of a sample of modules, Briggs 
and Briggs (2009: 549) have stated that Barrio Adentro has 
‘emerged from creative interactions between policy makers, clini-
cians, community workers, and residents, adopting flexible, prob-
lem-solving strategies.’ According to government sources infant 
mortality fell from 20.7 per thousand live births in the 1995-2000 
period to 15.50 per thousand live births in 2005 (Ministerio del Po-
der Popular para la Planificación y el Desarrollo, 2008). However, 
CEPAL (2006) indicates only a discrete improvement in some of the 
country’s social and demographic indicators. In its analysis, the in-
fant mortality rate fell to 19 per thousand live births in 2000-2005 
whereas the life expectancy at birth increased from 72.2 years in 
the period 1995-2000 to 72.8 years in the period 2000-2005, and is 
expected to continue to increase in the period 2005-2010 to 73.8 
years. Nonetheless, Jones (2008) has pointed to the notable ero-
sion of the program: in his analysis, many of the health modules are 
functioning below capacity while numerous others have closed 
down. A significant number of Cuban doctors have fled the country, 
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whereas the government’s spending on Barrio Adentro has worked 
to the detriment of the proper functioning of public hospitals. 
The government has also implemented Misión Mercal. The aim 
of this mission is to sell food at discounted prices in the poorer ar-
eas of the country. In order to do this, Misión Mercal has developed 
an infrastructure consisting of 30 markets, 12,213 mini-markets, 
and 261 mobile points of distribution, which according to official 
sources, reaches nearly 40 per cent of the Venezuelan population 
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Planificación y el Desarrollo, 
2006). 
According to the Venezuelan National Statistics Institute (INE, 
2005) the country’s poverty level increased from 48.1 per cent in 
2000, to 61 per cent in 2003 and 20045. President Chávez blamed 
the oil strike of 2003 for such an increase and asked the INE for the 
application of a new method of measuring poverty. In response, the 
INE began to measure poverty by way of a very complex method 
using indicators such as revenue, access to health care, vulnerabil-
ity to environmental risks, access to education, and social and civic 
rights transfers (INE, 2006). Yet, the INE has never explained how 
to actually estimate the poverty rate using these kind of data. By 
applying the new methodology the INE reported that between 2004 
and 2005 poverty had decreased a total of fourteen points.  
According to CEPAL (2007) the recent trend in poverty reduction 
in Latin America is mostly associated with the high levels of eco-
nomic growth experienced in the region since 2004, alongside the 
implementation of large-scale social programs, and Venezuela is 
not the exception. In 2006 the areas’ GDP reached 5 per cent with 
Venezuela topping the bill with a GDP of 9.5 per cent.  
                                                      
5 It is interesting to note that in the newer electronic bulletins the INE (2008) has changed 
this figure to 47 per cent for 2004.  
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Regardless the benefits that the missions have brought to the 
poor, they tend to show important shortcomings. Maingon (2004) 
has argued that the regime’s social policies appear to be disjointed 
appendages of the central government, not constitutional and state 
policies of a permanent character. Moreover, the administration of 
these policies is opaque and strongly coupled to political affinities. 
Penfold-Becerra (2007: 65) writes in relation to this issue that the 
“missions were financed through opaque and non-budgetary 
mechanisms; namely by transferring oil revenues directly from 
PDVSA to a special fund managed by the presidency. According to 
PDVSA’s financial statements, in 2004 the fund managed more 
than $ 5 billion, close to four per cent of the GDP.” What we are 
witnessing, in Maingon’s (2004) and Corrales’ (2009) analyses, is 
the construction of a parallel institutional apparatus of a civic-
military character. This is an authoritarian and centralist framework 
that openly contradicts the participatory premises contained in the 
1999 Bolivarian Constitution.  
THE TWO FACES THESIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR VENEZUELAN 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION 
The better known accounts concerning the nature of the Boli-
varian revolution and the intimately connected theme of the political 
polarization following its inception are those of Gott (2000), Cor-
rales (2005), Cedeño (2006), Cannon (2008), and Heath (2009). 
Gott describes the Chávez regime as one driven by a radical na-
tionalist doctrine very much opposed to globalization and the Wash-
ington consensus. In Gott’s view, Chávez represents the voice of 
the silent and oppressed majority, and understands Venezuelan 
polarization as the result of the confrontation between the destitute 
masses and the oligarchy, mostly the Venezuelan elite and the up-
per-middle classes. Now, there is undoubtedly a strong class com-
ponent in the political polarization existing in Venezuela. 
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Chart 2. Support for President Chávez by Social Strata 2007 
Social Strata % Support  
for president Chavez 
A 15.8 
B 21.1 
C 30.8 
D 30.5 
E 43.6 
Source: UCAB (2007). 
As can be seen in Chart 2 support for president Chávez in-
creases as we go down the class structure. Yet to assume that 
Chávez’s opposition is mostly recruited from the elites and the up-
per-middle classes ho are fighting to preserve free-market policies, 
and to capture the state’s oil revenue is to misrepresent the conflict 
in question6. The fact is that in all of the presidential elections and 
referenda taking place since 1998, the opposition has obtained in 
between 39 and 52 per cent of the total ballot (Consejo Nacional 
Electoral, 2006). In Venezuela, as in most developing nations, the 
elites and the upper-middle classes combined represent a very 
small percentage of the total population, only 12 per cent in the 
case of Venezuela according to Ugalde et al. (2004). This signifies 
that a substantial number of non-elite people, and even some seg-
ments among the poor, as Chart two demonstrates oppose presi-
dent Chávez. In a recent study Lupu (2009) has provided statistical 
evidence showing that in recent elections support for Chávez is 
increasing among segments of the lower middle-class, not from the 
very poor. Thus, Gott’s traditional class-conflict approach to Vene-
zuelan polarization should be avoided in favor of an approach that 
is open to consider the existence of a complex cluster of variables 
working to produce the country’s elevated degree of political con-
flict. For instance, in a more sophisticated version of the conflict 
approach, Cannon (2008) has argued that race represents an im-
                                                      
6 Only a small segment of the Venezuelan business class supports free-market polices. 
See (Ugalde et al., 2004).   
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portant issue in the support for Chávez. A second contribution 
stemming from conflict theory is that offered by Heath (2009), who 
argues that much of the class element at play in Venezuelan poli-
tics under Chávez is the result of the president’s own class driven 
discourse and that ‘there is little evidence to support the idea that 
there had been any translation of class conditions into a sense of 
class self-awareness prior to the emergence of Chávez’. 
Corrales (2005) has provided a compounded explanation for the 
high level of polarization existing in Venezuela. He argues that 
state intervention in the economy under Chávez is not only rejected 
by some powerful economic associations, but also by some low-
income groups. In his view many of Chávez’s supporters simply 
expected him to protect them from the more troublesome effects of 
the neo-liberal reforms implemented by president C. A. Pérez; 
nonetheless, Corrales argues that president Chávez’s ‘heavy-
handed’ methods alienated a significant number of his supporters. 
A second cause explaining polarization, according to Corrales, was 
the move by president Chávez to put in place a number of mecha-
nisms to help him remain in power. This produced a strong confron-
tation between those who claim that the president’s actions are 
justified in bringing about social democracy, and those who think 
Chávez spends all of his time devising newer and more effective 
ways to construct a dictatorship. 
Finally, Cedeño (2006: 97) argues that Venezuelan polarization 
is inextricably related to conflicting views concerning modernization. 
For the elites and the middle-classes, modernization is about over-
coming anachronistic economic formations and archaic cultural 
imaginaries, yet for president Chávez and many of his followers, 
global modernization is associated with social marginalization and 
loss of national sovereignty. Cedeño argues that in Venezuela 
there is a process of recomposing the concept of the modern, 
which legitimizes the installment of radical forms of populism. 
Hence, the Bolivarian revolution ‘annuls the socio-temporal diver-
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sity of Venezuelans their heterogeneous logics, the different ways 
they experience and conceptualize the country’s history’. 
The present article makes the case for the inclusion of another 
variable into the analysis of Venezuelan political polarization: the 
existence of profound differences regarding the meanings Vene-
zuelans attach to democracy.  Charts three, four, and five are of-
fered in support of this argument. Chart three shows the way 
Venezuelans perceive the quality of the country’s democracy under 
Chávez. 
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Chart 37. Venezuela 2008 perceptions on the quality of Venezuelan 
democracy 
Positive perceptions  Negative perceptions 
Forty-nine per cent of a sample 
positively values the workings of 
Venezuelan demo-cracy. High-
est score for Latin America in 
2008. Level reached 59% in 
2007, second highest in Latin 
America (Latinobarómetro, 
2008) 
Sixty-two per cent of a sample 
report that Venezuelans are not 
equal before the Law (Latino-
barómetro, 2008)  
Seventy per cent of a sample 
criticize the performance of the 
ombudsman (Datanálisis, 2005) 
Eighty-two per cent of a sample 
report that democracy is the 
best form of government  
(Latinobarómetro, 2008) 
Seventy-six per cent of a sample 
report that public institutions do 
not work efficiently (Latino-
barómetro, 2008) 
  Fifty-four per cent of a sample 
report that Judges can be bribed 
(Latinobarómetro, 2008). This is 
the highest score for the 18 Latin 
American countries included in 
the Latinobarómetro study 
  Eighty per cent of a sample report 
that government does not do 
enough to fight corruption 
(Datanálisis, 2008) 
Chart three reveals the existence of a notable contradiction in 
the way democracy is perceived among Venezuelans, whereby 
democracy is highly rated (especially in 2007) despite the fact that 
important aspects of the democratic process, such as the rule of 
law, control of corruption, and government effectiveness, are poorly 
                                                      
7 Methodological note 1: It was impossible to present longitudinal data for the selected 
indicators. Latinobarómetro and Datanálisis both tend to vary the questions included in 
their surveys. 
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evaluated. This issue is highly significant for Venezuela shows the 
highest popular support for democracy in  Latin America for 2008.  
Chart four introduces social class into the analysis. By doing this 
we can start to realize the complexities involved in the contradiction 
annotated above. It must be noted that the Latinobarómetro survey 
does not stratify its sample by class. Additionally, neither 
Datanálisis nor UCAB include in their surveys direct questions re-
garding perceptions about the quality of democracy. Hence, the 
approach to this issue will necessarily proceed by relying upon sta-
tistical figures that tender indirect evidence for the relationship be-
tween social class and perceptions on the quality of democracy.  
 
Chart 4. Venezuela 20058 Support for Government, National As-
sembly,  
Supreme Court, and the Ombudsman, by Social Strata 
So-
cial  
strata 
Support for  
government 
% 
Performance of 
the National As-
sembly 
% Persons re-
sponding 
Very Bad, Bad, 
Regular 
to bad 
Performance of the  
Supreme Court  
% Persons re-
sponding  
Very Bad, Bad, 
Regular to Bad 
Perform-
ance of 
Ombuds-
man  
% Persons 
responding  
Very Bad, 
Bad, 
Regular to 
Bad 
A & B 10 45 58 48 
C 24.5 30 31 24. 4 
D 45 27 31 18 
E 55.9 20 22.1 9.1 
                                                      
8 Methodological note 2: The year 2005 was selected because it is the only year for which 
Datanálisis collected data on perceptions on the performance of the Government, the 
National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the Ombudsman. 
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Source: Datanálisis. Omnibus surveys 2004-2008 (2008). 
As Chart four reveals social class is positively correlated to both 
levels of support for the government and to perceptions regarding 
the quality of democracy. It is notable that the poorer strata tend to 
support the workings of present day Venezuelan democracy. Yet, 
Mainwaring and Scully (2008:123) have observed that ‘good gov-
ernance does not always generate popular support’ and that ‘gov-
ernments that govern poorly are nevertheless sometimes able to 
capture the public’s backing.’ In their view Chávez provides a good 
example of a president who ranks low in regards democratic gov-
ernance, and yet the poor consider him to be a democratic leader. 
These trends seem to lend support to our thesis that Chávez’s fol-
lowers are inclined to understand democracy as a system that 
guarantees access to basic goods and services. Yet, the UCAB 
(2007) poverty project has revealed that in Venezuela the poor also 
embrace voting as an important aspect of democracy.  
Chart five explores the extent to which Venezuelans are satis-
fied with the provision of public goods and services. 
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Chart 5. Venezuela. Levels of satisfaction with the public provision 
of goods  
and services by total sample and by political affinity 
Levels of satisfaction with the 
public provision  
of goods and services 
Total sample President 
Chávez’s 
supporters 
Education.  
Persons responding “Satisfied” 
or “Very Satisfied” +  “Satisfied” 
57.2 % 
(Datanálisis, 2008) 
61.8 % 
(UCAB, 2007) 
74 % 
(Latinobarómetro, 
2007) 
88.0 % 
(Datanálisis, 
2008) 
Health.  
Persons responding  “Satisfied” 
or  “Very Satisfied” + “Satisfied” 
52 % 
(Datanálisis, 2008) 
64% 
(Latinobarómetro, 
2007) 
57 % 
(UCAB, 2007) 
86 % 
(Datanálisis, 
2008) 
Distribution of discounted food 
(Mission Mercal) 
Persons responding “Satisfied” 
vs. “Unsatisfied” 
65 % 
(UCAB ,2007) 
63.3 % 
(Datanálisis, 
2008) 
Chart five reveals that a significant number of Venezuelans, es-
pecially those supporting president Chávez are satisfied with the 
public provision of basic goods and services. At this point in the 
analysis, I must return to the tradition versus modernity polemic 
introduced in previous sections of this article. In their comprehen-
sive study of the relationship between culture and poverty, Ugalde 
et al. (2004) have argued that due to the rentier nature of the Vene-
zuelan state, all social strata have retained a traditional component 
in their culture. Rather than producing citizens, they say, the politi-
cal system has tended to produce clients who struggle to capture 
the oil revenues of the state.  
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Nevertheless, beyond this generalization, the argument follows, 
differences in values between poorer and richer strata can be rec-
ognized. Modern dispositions seem to be more embedded among 
the upper and the educated classes, whereas the poor seem to 
embrace more traditional values associated to paternalism and the 
need for affective relationships outside of the home. Additionally, 80 
per cent of those holding traditional values reported that participa-
tion in political parties should be rewarded with ‘political favors’; that 
personal life is the outcome of chance and providence not the result 
of one’s own doing; and that the state should help the poor improve 
their socio-economic status.  
The Latinobarómetro (2007) study has uncovered similar per-
ceptions about the role of the state among Venezuelans. Indeed, 
Venezuela is the Latin American country with the highest percent-
age of population expressing the opinion that the state ‘can solve 
all problems’. The percentage of people expressing this notion has 
increased during Chavez’s years in office: from 46 per cent of the 
population in 1997 to 67 per cent in 2007. The political implication 
of these findings is that many individuals among the poor would be 
willing to support a political system characterized by populist prac-
tice and charismatic-messianic leadership. Hence, in Venezuela we 
find a very good match between peoples’ expectations of govern-
ment and governmental practice itself.   
The figures offered in Charts three, four, and five allow for the 
following statements: (a) there is a notable divergence in the way 
Venezuelans understand the meaning and practice of democracy; 
(b) support for Venezuelan democracy under Chávez is highly 
stratified by social class: higher social strata are much more critical 
of the workings of Venezuelan democracy than lower social strata. 
Yet significant segments of the poor adverse the president; (c) 
lower social strata are remarkably satisfied with the public provision 
of services and goods, (d) the poorer strata, and to a lesser degree, 
the lower middle-class tends to support president Chávez’s gov-
ernment, and (e) the poor and lower middle-classes tend to support 
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a range of institutions essential to democracy: the National Assem-
bly, the Supreme Court, and the office of the Ombudsman.  
Hence, we can tentatively conclude by stating the thesis that the 
distinct faces of the Bolivarian revolution, authoritarianism and wel-
fare, as described in previous sections of this article are playing a 
crucial role in determining the course of political polarization in 
Venezuela. Yet, a more comprehensive understanding of this issue 
must take into account a complex cluster of factors such as 
Chávez’s socially divisive discourse (Hawkins, 2003; Cannon, 
2008; Heath, 2009), the intolerance of his regime towards political 
opponents and critics (HRW, 2008), and his anti-modern stance 
which works to produce a great deal of ontological relief among the 
poor but a great deal of frustration among the middle-classes’ ex-
pectations for the future. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The present article started with the observation that the Boli-
varian revolution exhibits two distinct faces: an authoritarian face 
and a welfare face. Then the article hypothesized that the high lev-
els of political polarization existing in Venezuela under president 
Chávez are associated to whichever face of the Bolivarian revolu-
tion the observer/agent is willing to emphasize: critics of the presi-
dent usually refer to his anti-democratic practices, whereas 
supporters praise his commitment to the plight of the poor. The 
article provided a detailed analysis of these two faces: on the one 
hand it provided evidence to support the claim that under Chávez, 
the Venezuelan political regime has moved to a dominant power 
system. Also, that such a shift toward authoritarianism was the re-
sult of the arrival of an uncivil movement to power. On the other 
hand, the investigation showed that the Chávez government has 
significantly increased social spending in areas such as education 
and health, and has implemented a number of social programs 
that, despite being well received by the poor, have failed to trans-
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late into formalized institutional systems dedicated to the rational 
and non-partisan distribution of key services. 
Finally, the article explored the issue of whether the agents en-
gaged in the political process would echo such a duality in their 
perceptions of the quality of Venezuelan democracy. Relying upon 
statistical data produced by Venezuelan and international organiza-
tions, the article was able to provide evidence for the argument that 
under Chávez’s presidency, we are witnessing a strong, and at 
times violent, confrontation between individuals and groups who 
hold two different conceptions of the meaning of democracy: higher 
social strata seem to be operating under a political and civil rights 
perspective of democracy, whereas lower strata appear to adhere 
to the notion of democratic practice as mostly characterized by ac-
cess to basic goods and services as legitimate rights, and voting. In 
consonance with other studies our research found that there is a 
strong class component in the Venezuelan political process, yet our 
findings call for a more comprehensive approach to polarization 
that avoids economic reductionism and is prepared to include in the 
analysis other variables whose interconnection may better reveal 
the complexities inherent in the conflict.          
The defeat of the constitutional reform initiative of 2007, a pro-
ject championed by Chávez, should have signaled a new era for 
Venezuelan politics. The juncture offered a very good historical op-
portunity for the government to seek a national consensus around 
the notion of building a novel model of political and social democ-
racy, one that would allow for the synthesis between two systems 
of aspiration –both legitimate and desirable– which have been ir-
reconcilable until now: the aim to establish a mode of governance 
that respects civil rights and liberties, and the development of poli-
cies oriented toward reducing social exclusion and poverty. Not-
withstanding, the president responded by passing many of the laws 
included in the 2007 project for constitutional change by decree, 
and by demanding the realization of a new constitutional referen-
dum that would allow him to run indefinitely for office. As is well 
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known the president won this referendum with 54 per cent of the 
vote.  
The confrontation between diverging views regarding the mean-
ing and practice of democracy among Venezuelan social classes, 
in conjunction with Chávez’s authoritarian style and his determina-
tion to keep passing controversial policies by decree, indicate that 
in all likelihood, polarization will continue to be the dominating fe-
ture of Venezuela’s political system for a long time to come.  
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